




















                                  
 
    
 
Working Paper Series 
WP 2009-19 
School of Economic Sciences 
 
A Tale of Two Externalities: 
Environmental Policy and Market 







 June, 2010 
 A Tale of Two Externalities:
Environmental Policy and Market Structure￿
Ana Esp￿nola-Arredondoy









This paper examines the two externalities that a country￿ s environmental regulation imposes
on other country￿ s welfare: an environmental externality, due to transboundary pollution, and a
competitive advantage externality, as regulations a⁄ect domestic ￿rms￿abatement costs, which
impact the pro￿ts of their foreign competitors. We ￿rst analyze the emission standards that
countries independently set under di⁄erent market structures and then compare them with the
standards set under international environmental agreements that internalize one or both types
of externalities. The paper hence disentangles the e⁄ect of each externality. We show that
￿rms￿pro￿ts increase when countries participate in international treaties if the environmental
damage from pollution is relatively low and such pollution is not signi￿cantly transboundary.
We hence demonstrate that international environmental agreements can serve as cooperative
devices ￿rms use to ameliorate overproduction and increase pro￿ts, without the need to form
collusive agreements.
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11 Introduction
Most pollution has a transboundary nature, since it a⁄ects not only the country where it is produced
but also neighboring countries. In order to control pollution, governments extensively use emission
standards as an environmental policy. When countries independently select emission standards,
however, they impose two external e⁄ects on other countries￿welfare. First, emission standards
produce an environmental externality on other countries due to transboundary pollution. Second,
environmental regulations can be used as a tool to support domestic ￿rms in their international
competition. Speci￿cally, countries have incentives to set relatively lax environmental policies that
reduce national ￿rms￿costs, increasing its pro￿ts relative to foreign competitors. The negative
e⁄ect on foreign ￿rms￿pro￿ts can be understood as a ￿competitive advantage externality,￿or eco-
dumping.1 International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) are commonly proposed as a tool to
reduce emission standards, helping internalize the environmental externality associated to trans-
boundary pollution. Nonetheless, IEAs can also be used to ameliorate the negative e⁄ects of the
competitive advantage externality. The bene￿ts from IEAs would therefore be twofold: ￿rst, a
mitigation of global pollution and, second, the control of eco-dumping.
In this paper we disentangle these bene￿ts by analyzing two di⁄erent market structures, where
one or both of the external e⁄ects are present.2 We investigate a monopoly where the compet-
itive advantage externality is absent since the domestic ￿rm does not face foreign competition.
Nonetheless, less strict emission standards in one country still impose an environmental externality
on other countries, due to the transboundary nature of pollution. Then, we also study the case
of oligopolistic market structures, where a country￿ s decision to relax the environmental standards
to its national ￿rms imposes two types of negative externalities on other countries: environmental
and competitive advantage externalities.
The paper examines the strategic incentives countries face when selecting their environmental
policies by considering a two-stage game where, ￿rst, governments independently set their domestic
environmental regulations, and second, every ￿rm decides its production level given the emission
standards countries previously established. The presence of the aforementioned externalities induces
countries to set lax environmental standards. In contrast, by participating in international treaties,
countries are capable of internalizing one or both types of externalities. Speci￿cally, when countries
participate in an international agreement, they ￿rst jointly decide the emission levels to be included
in the treaty, and second, ￿rms respond by choosing their output levels, given the commitments
signed in the international agreement.
We show that emission standards under monopoly are less stringent than under oligopoly, both
when countries independently set their emission levels and when they choose their environmental
regulations within an IEA. The paper also analyzes countries￿free-riding incentives under di⁄erent
1Strictly speaking, the ￿competitive advantage externality￿is a pecuniary externality (or spillover e⁄ect), since a
change in the environmental regulation in one country a⁄ects the pro￿ts of ￿rms located in other countries.
2We initially assume that producers sell all their output in a third market. This assumption is relaxed in section
6, where producers sell a fraction of their total production to domestic consumers.
2market structures. Speci￿cally, these incentives are de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the envi-
ronmental standards every country independently selects and those when countries participate in
international agreements that internalize either (or both) externalities. In particular, we show that
countries￿free-riding incentives are larger under monopoly than oligopoly, despite the fact that
under monopoly only the environmental externality is present, while under oligopoly both types of
externalities exist. Intuitively, more relaxed environmental regulations induce a larger increase in
pro￿ts for the monopolist than for the oligopolist. Countries with monopolistic ￿rms therefore set
weakly less strict emission levels than countries with ￿rms competing in an international oligopoly.
Besides countries￿incentives to participate in international agreements, we investigate ￿rms￿
interests towards these treaties. Under monopoly markets, we demonstrate that the participation
in an IEA only imposes a negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts since more stringent environmental standards
increase the monopolist￿ s abatement costs. However, under oligopoly markets, setting more strin-
gent emission standards under the treaty imposes two e⁄ects on pro￿ts: a negative e⁄ect due to
higher abatement costs, but also a positive e⁄ect, since stricter emission standards in all countries
participating in the IEA reduce aggregate output (ameliorating overproduction in oligopoly).
Comparing the relative size of these e⁄ects, we show that when the environmental damage is
relatively high, countries set very stringent emission standards when participating in an interna-
tional treaty, imposing a negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts that dominates the positive e⁄ect. Therefore,
oligopoly pro￿ts are lower when countries participate in international agreements than when they
do not, leading ￿rms to oppose their countries￿participation in the international treaty. In con-
trast, when the environmental damage from pollution is relatively low, countries slightly reduce
their emission standards under the treaty, which imposes a positive e⁄ect on oligopoly pro￿ts (due
to the reduction in output) that outweighs the negative e⁄ect that such environmental regulation
imposes on costs. Hence, ￿rms would actually favor their countries￿participation in IEAs. In-
tuitively, the emission standards countries set in international agreements serve as a cooperative
device ￿rms use to ameliorate overproduction and increase pro￿ts without the need to form explicit
collusive agreements. One example of ￿rms supporting IEAs is the ￿e-mission 55￿initiative, where
more than 200 companies from around the world are grouped to favor their countries￿implemen-
tation of the Kyoto protocol.3 Similarly, several ￿rms and industry organizations supported the
Montreal protocol in order to guarantee an equal environmental regulation as their competitors;
see Bernhagen (2008). An additional example is the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, where
46 companies constitute the ￿largest U.S.-based association of corporations focused on [...] policy
solutions to climate change￿promoting ￿targets for GHG emission reductions￿including among its
members Boeing, DuPont and GE.4 Furthermore, we show that the set of environmental damages
for which ￿rms support IEAs shrinks as pollution becomes more transboundary. In particular,
3A ￿rm￿ s support of IEAs does not need to be related with that ￿rm￿ s green practices, since its promotion of IEAs
is only oriented in reducing aggregate output. In addition, note that ￿rms￿support of international treaties could
also be explained by the ￿rm￿ s public image towards environmentally-oriented customers. Our paper shows that,
even in the absence of public image considerations, ￿rms would still favor IEAs under certain parameter conditions.
4See http://www.pewclimate.org/
3emission standards under the IEA are more stringent, inducing a larger negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts.
Finally, we demonstrate that ￿rms would favor countries￿participation in IEAs that only internalize
the environmental e⁄ects of pollution under more general conditions than if the treaty internalizes
both the environmental and competitive advantage externality.
We examine two extensions to our model. First, we analyze the case in which oligopolists form
a cartel agreement, and investigate how countries￿environmental regulation is a⁄ected by ￿rms￿
decision to collude, both when countries independently set their domestic emission standards and
when they participate in IEAs. Speci￿cally, we show that countries￿marginal bene￿t from setting
less stringent emission levels to domestic ￿rms is larger when ￿rms form a cartel than when they
compete as oligopolists, ultimately inducing countries to set less strict emission standards, both
with and without IEAs. Hence, environmental regulation becomes ￿softer￿when regulating ￿rms
that belong to an international cartel, providing them with additional incentives to form and sustain
such collusive agreements.
Second, we extend our model to the case in which countries take into account domestic consumer
surplus.5 We show that emission standards increase in the importance that countries assign to their
consumers￿welfare, both when countries do not participate in international treaties, and when they
do. Furthermore, this result applies for di⁄erent degrees of the transboundary externality, including
the case where the environmental externality is absent.
Previous literature analyzes the environmental externality that local producers located in a sin-
gle country impose on the country￿ s welfare when pollution is non-transboundary and how emission
standards can serve to eliminate this domestic externality; see Maloney and McCormick (1982),
Ebert (1998) and Farzin (2003). In contrast, our paper considers a general setting in which ￿rms in-
teract in an international market and pollution can either be transboundary or non-transboundary.
Other studies examine the competitive advantage externality that results when multiple coun-
tries independently select their environmental policies. In particular, Kennedy (1994) examines
countries￿incentives to strategically set environmental taxes in a context where pollution is trans-
boundary, whereas Barrett (1994a) investigates both taxes and emission standards assuming that
pollution is non-transboundary. Similarly, Ulph (1996a) uses a non-transboundary setting to study
how countries￿strategic environmental regulations a⁄ect ￿rms￿previous investment decision in re-
search and development.6 Our study hence contributes to this literature by considering not only
the competitive advantage but also the environmental externality, and disentangles the separate
e⁄ect of each type of externality. Unlike previous work, our paper identi￿es under which conditions
￿rms favor their countries￿participation in IEAs that internalize either (or both) type of exter-
5Setting less stringent emission standards increases domestic output, which under oligopoly increases the consumer
surplus not only of domestic but also of foreign buyers of the good. Hence, higher emission standards impose a new
type of externality: namely, a positive ￿consumer surplus￿externality on foreign countries. We describe this type of
externality in section 6.2.
6Other studies analyze countries￿strategic incentives when setting environmental regulations to domestic produc-
ers. For models where ￿rms￿location is exogenous see Conrad (1993), Ulph (1996b) and Feenstra et al. (2003), and
for models in which ￿rm￿ s location is an endogenous variable see Markusen et al. (1992, 1993), Rauscher (1993) and
Ulph (1994).
4nality. Furthermore, we study how ￿rms￿incentives to collude are a⁄ected by countries￿signature
of an environmental agreement. Summarizing, this paper examines emission standards and ￿rms￿
equilibrium pro￿ts when both externalities are present, and how countries￿participation in IEAs
might serve as a tool ￿rms use to reduce overproduction in oligopolistic market structures.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model, and section 3 describes
￿rms￿equilibrium output during the second stage of the game, under di⁄erent market structures.
In section 4, we analyze emission standards under monopoly markets, and how they are a⁄ected
by countries￿participation in international agreements. Section 5 examines emission standards
under oligopoly, and compares them with those under monopoly. Section 6 extends our model by
analyzing cartel agreements and consumer surplus. We ￿nally discuss the main results.
2 Model
Let us consider two countries which independently determine their environmental regulation and
one ￿rm located in each country. In particular, every country i chooses the environmental standard
that regulates the emissions produced by the ￿rm located in its jurisdiction. Pollution can either
a⁄ect the country where emissions were generated alone (non-transboundary emissions), or both
the country that originally produced them and the foreign country (transboundary emissions).
Similarly to Kennedy (1994), let ￿ ￿ 0 be the emissions from country i that reach country j,
producing an environmental externality. Note that if ￿ = 0 emissions from one country do not
impose any environmental externality on the foreign country, as in Ulph (1996a) and in Barrett
(1994a), while if ￿ = 1 emissions a⁄ect both countries equally. Finally, ￿ > 1 represents the case
where pollution imposes larger environmental damages on the foreign than on the domestic country.
In addition, assume that ￿rms are symmetric both in their production and abatement costs.
Production costs are
qi
￿ , where a high parameter ￿ > 0 represents an e¢ cient production process.
Using an approach similar to Ulph (1996a), let every unit of output qi be associated to one unit of
pollution.7 Hence, the amount of pollution that ￿rm i must abate given the emission standard ei
is
Ai ￿ qi ￿ ei
represented by the di⁄erence between the ￿rm￿ s pollution (associated to output) and the emission
standard to be observed. Intuitively, an emission standard is more stringent the lower the emission
level ei is, since it induces the ￿rm to further abate its emissions. Following the functional forms
used by Barrett (1994b) and Ulph (1996a), let abatement costs be
2A2
i
￿ , which decrease as the
￿rm becomes more e¢ cient (higher ￿), and are increasing and convex in the abatement level, Ai.
Assuming an inverse linear demand P(Q) = a￿Q, where Q denotes aggregate output, ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts
7In the case that every unit of output generates less than one unit of emissions, ￿rms￿abatement costs would be
reduced, resulting in an increase in both monopoly and duopoly output. Nonetheless, the qualitative features of the
model would be una⁄ected.
5are given by






It is straightforward to verify that the marginal cost of producing one additional unit of qi,
1￿4ei
￿ + 4
￿qi, is decreasing in ei, i.e., less stringent emission standards decrease ￿rms￿marginal costs.
We assume that demand satis￿es a > 1
￿.8. We analyze two market structures: monopoly, whereby
a single producer supplies a good to the international market, and duopoly, where ￿rms located in
both countries sell the same product competing in quantities in the international market.
Finally, country i￿ s social welfare is Wi(qi;qj;ei;ej) = ￿i (qi;qj;ei) ￿ d ￿ (ei + ￿ej), which
increases in ￿rm i￿ s pro￿ts and decreases in the environmental damage associated to domestic and
foreign emissions.9 The environmental damage of an additional unit of domestic emissions is d > 0,
and that of foreign emissions is ￿d ￿ 0. In addition, note that pro￿ts of ￿rm i only depend on the
emission standards from country i when the ￿rm is a monopolist, whereas pro￿ts depend on the
emission levels set by both countries if it is a duopolist.10 The time structure of the game is as
follows:
1. In the ￿rst stage of the game, every country i determines its own equilibrium emission stan-
dard. For comparison, we consider the following scenarios:
(a) Countries do not participate in an international environmental agreement. Hence, every
country independently selects its own emission standard under no treaty, NT, eNT
i ;
(b) Countries participate in an international environmental treaty that reduces the envi-
ronmental damage caused from transboundary pollution. Thus, emission standards se-




(c) Countries participate in an international treaty that internalizes both types of externali-
ties: the environmental externality and the competitive advantage externality. We refer
to the emission standards that internalize both externalities as (eBE
i ;eBE
j ).
2. In the second stage of the game, given the emission standard set by every country, ￿rms choose
their production levels qi(ei;ej) and qj(ej;ei), either as monopolists selling their products to
separate international markets, or as duopolists competing in the same international market.
8This condition guarantees existence when ￿rms compete as Cournot duopolists, as shown in the proof of Lemma
1 below, given that the marginal willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit, p(0) = a, exceeds the marginal cost associated
with its production,
1￿4ei
￿ , for all emission standards ei ￿ 0.
9For simplicity, we assume that the marginal environmental damage from pollution, d, is constant in emission
levels. Nonetheless, considering an increasing marginal environmental damage does not a⁄ect the implications of our
results.
10Similarly to Barrett (1994a) and Ulph (1996a), we initially assume that every ￿rm sells its production to the
international market, and that consumers located in country i are a negligible share of all consumers in the interna-
tional market. As a consequence, country i￿ s social welfare does not include consumer surplus. This assumption is
relaxed in section 6, where we investigate how emission standards are a⁄ected by the share of national customers in
the international demand for the good. The qualitative results of the paper are una⁄ected.
63 Equilibrium Output
Let us describe ￿rms￿production decision during the second stage of the game when they take
emission standards as given. In particular, when ￿rms compete as Cournot duopolists every ￿rm










i (qj;ei) is increasing in the emission standard ei (producing an outward shift in
￿rm i￿ s best response function). Intuitively, a less stringent environmental standard reduces ￿rm
i￿ s marginal costs, inducing it to produce larger amounts, which leads ￿rm j to produce lower
output levels. Hence, setting less strict emission standards serves as a strategic pre-commitment,
as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), a⁄ecting ￿rms￿competitiveness in the posterior stage of the
game.11;12 Next we analyze equilibrium output, both under monopolistic and duopolistic markets.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium output under monopoly is qM
i (ei) =
(a￿￿1)+4ei








2(2+￿) if ei ￿ ei,
￿[a(4+￿)￿1￿4ej]+8ei(2+￿)￿4
(4+￿)(4+3￿) if ei ￿ ei < ei, and
0 if ei < ei
where ei ￿
(a￿￿1)(4+￿)+(2+￿)8ej

















Figure 1. Equilibrium output.
11In particular, this strategic setting corresponds to the ￿Top Dog￿case in Fudenberg and Tirole￿ s (1984) classi￿-
cation of strategic pre-commitment decisions. Brander and Spencer (1985) use a similar strategic setting to analyze
governmental subsidy programs to exporters, improving their competitiveness with respect to foreign competitors.
12Note that this result also holds for di⁄erent demand and cost functions. In particular, it is satis￿ed if every ￿rm￿ s
best response function when competing as a Cournot duopolist is negatively sloped and experiences an upward shift
when countries set less stringent environmental regulations to their domestic ￿rms.
7As ￿gure 1 illustrates, ￿rm i￿ s output is zero when country i￿ s emission standards are low
relative to those of country j, i.e., ei < ei. In contrast, when country i￿ s emission standards are
relatively high, ei > ei, ￿rm j produces zero units, and ￿rm i becomes a monopoly. Finally, when
both countries￿environmental regulation is relatively similar, both ￿rm i and j produce a positive
output. Comparing monopoly and duopoly output, observe that the former is less sensitive to a
given increase in emission standards than the latter. Intuitively, the monopolist fully takes into
account the price decrease that results from producing a larger output, whereas the duopolist does
not fully internalize such price reduction. This leads the duopolist to increase more its production
as a result of less strict emission standards than the monopolist does.
4 Emission Standards under Monopoly
We next examine the ￿rst stage of the game in which countries set emission standards. In this
section, we analyze the case where every country has a ￿rm that operates as a monopolist, selling
its production to separate international markets. Regulating a monopoly imposes an environmental
externality (EE) on the welfare of other countries. It produces, however, no competitive advantage
externality (CAE) since less stringent environmental regulations in one country do not a⁄ect the
foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts (given its monopoly power). In the following section, we investigate emission
standards under duopoly, where both EE and CAE e⁄ects are present.
Let us ￿rst examine countries￿trade-o⁄s from marginally increasing emissions. On the one
hand, a marginal increase in the emission standard ei allowing ￿rms to emit more pollutants,
has an associated marginal environmental cost of MECi = d to country i, and a social marginal
environmental cost of SMEC = (1 + ￿)d to both countries, as depicted in ￿gure 2. On the other
hand, a marginal increase in ei raises the pro￿ts of the domestic monopoly.13 In particular, the






2+￿ei if ei < a￿￿1
2￿ , and
0 otherwise
13Alternatively, a marginal decrease in ei (more stringent emission standards) has an associated marginal environ-






























Figure 2. Emission standards under monopoly.
Starting at ei = 0, a marginal increase in ei raises monopoly pro￿ts by a relatively large amount,
but the additional pro￿ts from raising ei decrease as emission standards become larger (i.e., less
stringent emission standards exhibit decreasing marginal bene￿ts). Let us next analyze country i￿ s
equilibrium emission standards.
















i is decreasing in d, since a higher environmental damage induces every country
to set more stringent emission standards on its ￿rms. This result is also illustrated in ￿gure 2, where
an increase in MECi = d reduces e
M;NT
i . For values of d above dM, the marginal environmental
damage of emissions is su¢ ciently high to support an emission standard equal to zero.
4.1 Emission Standards under Treaty
This section analyzes the pair of emission standards that countries select when they participate in
an international treaty.14
Proposition 2. Emission standards of country i under monopoly when participating in inter-
national treaties that internalize the environmental externality, e
M;EE
i , or both externalities, e
M;BE
i ,











4 d if d < 1
1+￿dM, and
0 otherwise.
First, note that as suggested above the CAE e⁄ect is absent under monopoly. Hence, the emis-
sion standard that only internalizes the environmental externality coincides with that internalizing




i . Second, emission standards under the treaty are weakly
below those with no treaty, e
M;NT
i , since countries internalize the EE e⁄ect. In particular, note that
at a zero environmental damage, d = 0, emission standards with and without the treaty coincide.
A given increase in the environmental damage from pollution, however, induces a larger reduction
in the emission standard under the treaty than under no treaty. In addition, emission standards
under the treaty are weakly decreasing in ￿. Speci￿cally, when pollution is non-transboundary
(￿ = 0) the EE e⁄ect is absent, and emission standards under the treaty coincide with those under






i . In contrast, when pollution becomes more transboundary
(higher ￿), the EE e⁄ect is more signi￿cant. Therefore, emission standards under the treaty become
more stringent since they must internalize larger environmental damages.




i , provides a
measure of how much a country fails to fully internalize the environmental externality it imposes on
other countries. For simplicity, we denote this di⁄erence as countries￿free-riding behavior, FRM,
given that countries do not consider the EE e⁄ect that their independent environmental regulations










4 d for any 1
1+￿dM < d ￿ dM;
0 for any d > dM
When the environmental damage from pollution is zero, countries set the highest (least strin-
gent) environmental standards to their national ￿rms, both with and without the treaty. A similar
argument is applicable when d is relatively high, d > dM, since now countries need to impose
the most stringent environmental standards to their domestic ￿rms, with and without the treaty.
For intermediate values of d, the di⁄erence in emissions ￿rst increases and then decreases. First,
when d ￿ 1
1+￿dM, a given increase in the environmental damage d induces emission standards
under an environmental treaty to become more stringent than under no treaty, increasing the dif-
ference FRM. Second, for values of d exceeding 1
1+￿dM, countries participating in the IEA cannot
further reduce their emission standards, but emission standards under no treaty decrease in the
environmental damage of pollution, thus reducing the di⁄erence FRM.
Furthermore, FRM is weakly increasing in the transboundary nature of pollution, ￿. Speci￿-
cally, from lemma 1 and proposition 1 emission standards under no treaty, e
M;NT
i ,are constant in
￿, while those under the treaty, e
M;EE





i , re￿ ecting the presence of a more signi￿cant environmental externality.15
15In the case that ￿ = 0 free-riding is absent because there are no EE e⁄ects. Hence, non-transboundary pollution
105 Emission Standards under Duopoly
In this section, we analyze countries￿emission standards when ￿rms compete as Cournot duopolists
in the international market. Using the equilibrium output chosen by these ￿rms in the second stage
of the game, we examine countries￿equilibrium regulations under no treaty, e
C;NT
i , under the treaty
that internalizes the EE e⁄ect, e
C;EE




First, when countries participate in a treaty that internalizes the CAE e⁄ect, they consider the
negative externality they impose on foreign ￿rms. As a consequence, the marginal bene￿t from set-
ting less stringent emission standards when countries internalize both externalities, MB
C;BE
i (ei;ej),
is lower than when they do not, MBC
i (ei;ej), as ￿gure 3 below shows. Second, country i￿ s marginal
bene￿t from increasing its own emission standards decreases in the emission standards set by coun-
try j, both under no treaty and under either type of treaty. Intuitively, an increase in ej reduces the
additional bene￿ts that ￿rm i can obtain from less strict environmental regulations. Graphically,
an increase in ej produces a parallel inward shift both in MBC
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Figure 3. Emission standards under duopoly.
Third, the additional pro￿ts from less strict emission standards are higher for the monopolist
than that for the duopolist, i.e., MBM
i (ei) ￿ MBC
i (ei;ej) for given emissions ei and ej. Specif-
ically, a given increase in ei induces a larger increase in output for this duopolist than for the
monopolist, since the duopolist does not fully internalize the price-e⁄ect of its additional produc-
tion. This causes a larger decrease in prices for the duopolist than for the monopolist. Ultimately,
less stringent environmental regulations induce a smaller increase in pro￿ts for the duopolist than
for the monopolist.16 We next characterize equilibrium emissions under no treaty, e
C;NT
i .
induces countries to set the same environmental policy under monopoly markets, both with and without the treaty.
16This argument also applies to the analysis of an international oligopoly with more than two ￿rms. In particular,
setting less stringent emission standards to a domestic oligopolist induces a marginal increase in pro￿ts which is
decreasing in the number of ￿rms competing in the international oligopoly.















5.1 Emission Standards under treaty
Let us investigate countries￿emissions standards when their agreement internalizes the environ-
mental externality, e
C;EE
i , and when it internalizes both externalities, EE and CAE, e
C;BE
i .
Proposition 4. Emission standards under duopoly when countries participate in an interna-










4[48+￿(44+9￿)] d if d < 1
1+￿dC;NT, and
0 otherwise.
















Similarly to monopoly, the internalization of the EE e⁄ect under duopoly weakly reduces emis-




i , and this reduction is increasing in the extent of the trans-
boundary externality, ￿. The following corollary describes the ranking among emission levels, under
di⁄erent market structures, with and without IEAs.






i for a given market structure





Therefore, the above corollary establishes a complete ranking among all emission levels, where
emission standards under monopoly are weakly higher than under duopoly for all treaty/no treaty
scenarios, as the ￿gures below illustrate. Intuitively, the marginal increase in pro￿ts from setting less
stringent environmental standards to a monopolist is higher than that to a duopolist, which leads
countries to set less stringent environmental regulations to the former than to the latter. Figure
4, additionally, represents the reduction in emission standards under di⁄erent treaties, and for a





i ), and second, when countries internalize both the EE and CAE e⁄ects17 (weakly
decreasing emissions to e
C;BE
i ).
Figure 4(a): Emission standards for ￿ > 0. Figure 4(b): Emission standards for ￿ = 0:
Under non-transboundary pollution (￿ = 0, see Figure 4b), the EE e⁄ect is absent and emission






i . The CAE e⁄ect is still
present under duopoly, nonetheless, inducing countries to independently set lax emission standards





Let us next analyze to what extent countries￿independent choice of emission standards fails to





represents the di⁄erence between countries￿emission standards under no treaty and under the treaty





which measures the deviation of the emission standard under no treaty from that only internalizing
the EE e⁄ect. As ￿gure 5 indicates, FRC;BE, is larger than FRC;EE. Furthermore, the distance
in emission standards is weakly larger under monopoly than duopoly. This implies that allowing
countries to independently set environmental regulations to their national monopolists leads them to
larger environmental ine¢ ciencies, relative to the optimal level of emission standards. Nonetheless,
when the environmental damage is su¢ ciently high, the di⁄erence in emission standards is zero,
both under duopoly and monopoly.
17The emission standard under an international treaty that internalizes both types of externalities coincides with
that in the Pareto optimal pair of emission standards. That is, given countries￿social welfare function, there is no
other pair of emission standards for which one of the countries could be made better o⁄ without reducing the social
welfare of another country.
13Figure 5. Comparison of FR between monopoly and duopoly.
5.2 Firms￿pro￿ts
Let us now examine how countries￿participation in international agreements a⁄ects ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
Under monopoly, countries set more stringent emission standards when participating in interna-
tional agreements, reducing their pro￿ts. Speci￿cally, because monopolists fully internalize the
price e⁄ect of their production decision, countries￿participation in IEAs reduce ￿rms￿pro￿ts, rel-
ative to no treaty. Under duopoly, however, ￿rms do not fully internalize the price e⁄ect of their
output decisions. This leaves room for environmental regulations to serve as a cooperative device
￿rms use to ameliorate overproduction in duopoly and increase pro￿ts without the need to form
collusive agreements. The next proposition analyzes under which conditions ￿rms￿equilibrium
pro￿ts can actually increase as a result of countries￿participation in international agreements.
Proposition 5. Under duopoly, ￿rms￿ equilibrium pro￿ts with an international treaty that
internalizes the EE e⁄ect exceed those with no treaty if and only if d < dEE. Similarly, equilibrium
pro￿ts under an international treaty that internalizes both the EE and CAE e⁄ects are larger than
those with no treaty if and only if d < dBE. Furthermore, dBE < dEE for all parameter values,
where
dBE ￿
8(2 + ￿)(a￿ ￿ 1)
￿[48￿ + 44￿￿ + 9(2 + ￿)￿
2+16(7 + 6￿)]
and dEE ￿
16(2 + ￿)(a￿ ￿ 1)
(2 + ￿)￿(4 + ￿)(16 + 9￿)
Participation in international agreements induces countries to reduce their emission standards,
which imposes two e⁄ects on ￿rms￿pro￿ts. First, a negative e⁄ect, since more stringent emission
standards increase ￿rms￿abatement costs, which raises their marginal cost of production. Second,
it provides a positive e⁄ect on pro￿ts, since more stringent emission standards lead ￿rms to lower
production levels, increasing pro￿ts.
14The relative size of the two e⁄ects depends, nonetheless, on the environmental damage of
pollution. In particular, when environmental damage is relatively low, IEAs induce countries to
moderately reduce their emission levels. A reduction in both countries￿emission standards induces
a positive e⁄ect on ￿rms￿pro￿ts that outweighs the negative e⁄ect, ultimately increasing pro￿ts.
When environmental damage is relatively high, however, countries set stringent emission standards
under the treaty. A signi￿cant decrease in emission standards now decreases ￿rms￿pro￿ts, because
the positive e⁄ect is counterbalanced by the negative e⁄ect that more stringent environmental
regulation imposes on ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
Figure 6. Cuto⁄s dEE (solid) and dBE (dashed).
Figure 6 above depicts cuto⁄s dEE (solid line) and dBE (dashed line) where, for simplicity, we
consider18 a = 5 and ￿ = 1. The shaded area below every cuto⁄ illustrates pairs of environmental
damage, d, and extent of transboundary pollution, ￿, for which ￿rms support their countries￿
participation in IEAs which internalize the EE e⁄ect alone, or both external e⁄ects, respectively.
Furthermore, the fact that dBE < dEE implies that the set of environmental damages for which
￿rms support their countries￿participation in IEAs that internalize the EE e⁄ect, d < dEE, is
larger than those in treaties internalizing both the EE and CAE e⁄ects, d < dBE. Intuitively, the
signature of IEAs internalizing both e⁄ects imposes more stringent emission standards on ￿rms,
increasing abatement costs. As a consequence, the negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts described above is
larger when both externalities are taken into account.
Both cuto⁄s are decreasing in ￿, re￿ ecting that the set of environmental damages for which
￿rms favor IEAs shrinks as pollution becomes more transboundary. That is, more transboundary
pollution leads to more stringent treaties, increasing the aforementioned negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts.
As a consequence, ￿rms support IEAs if and only if the environmental damage from pollution is
relatively low and such pollution is not signi￿cantly transboundary. Finally, both cuto⁄s are in-
creasing in market demand, a, since higher demand increases the positive e⁄ect that more stringent
18A change in these parameters shifts cuto⁄s d
BE and d
EE, without altering the ranking between them.
15environmental standards produces on ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
6 Extensions
6.1 Cartel agreements
We next study the case in which duopolists form a cartel agreement, and investigate how countries￿
environmental regulation is a⁄ected by ￿rms￿decision to collude. In addition, we analyze how
countries￿signature of IEAs modi￿es ￿rms￿incentives to maintain the cartel agreement.
Proposition 6. Emission standards are less stringent when duopolists form a cartel than when
they compete in quantities, for a given NT/EE/BE scenario. Furthermore, equilibrium output
under the cartel agreement is weakly lower than under duopolistic competition, for any treaty/no







Intuitively, the increase in pro￿ts resulting from a marginal increase in emission standards is
larger for a ￿rm participating in a cartel agreement than for a Cournot duopolist. This induces
countries to set less strict emission standards to the former than to the latter, both when countries
participate in international treaties and when they do not.
Firm￿ s pro￿ts are higher under the cartel agreement than under Cournot competition for a
given environmental regulation. However, environmental regulation does not remain constant when
￿rms collude, relative to when they compete in quantities. Instead, emission standards become less
stringent, thus further increasing the pro￿ts of the ￿rms participating in the cartel. Countries
therefore become ￿softer￿when regulating a domestic ￿rm that belongs to an international cartel.
Hence, environmental policy does not necessarily reduce the market power of the cartel, but rather,
provides additional incentives to duopolists to form cartel agreements in order to face less stringent
environmental regulations. Furthermore, note that the increase in production associated to setting
less strict emission standards to the cartel participants does not overcome the reduction in output
due to the collusive agreement. Thus, cartel output is lower than that under duopoly. Finally,
and similarly to our previous results, countries￿environmental regulations become weakly more
stringent when they sign international agreements that internalize either the EE e⁄ect alone, or
both the EE and CAE e⁄ects.
6.2 Consumer surplus
Let us now consider the case in which the population of every country i represents a (non-negligible)
share ￿ > 0 of the international demand for the good. Under this assumption, governments
consider national consumer surplus when determining emission standards, both with and without
international treaties. In particular, country i￿ s social welfare becomes Wi(￿) = ￿CS(qi;qj) +
￿i(qi;qj;ei) ￿ d(ei + ￿ej). Under duopoly, a given increase in emission standards by country i
imposes, in addition to the EE and CAE e⁄ects, a positive externality on other countries due to
16the increase in consumer surplus resulting from larger production levels (and lower prices) that are
not only enjoyed by domestic but also by foreign consumers of the good. This consumer surplus
externality is present under duopoly but not under monopoly, since producers sell their product in
separate international markets.
We assume, however, that the positive e⁄ect of the consumer surplus externality does not
dominate the negative e⁄ect of the EE and CAE externalities. That is, less stringent emission
standards from one country still impose an overall negative externality on other countries￿welfare,19
and for this reason international treaties prescribe a reduction in emission levels.20 We denote the
international treaty that internalizes the three types of externalities by the superscript TE.
Proposition 7. Let ￿ > 0 be the weight every country assigns to its domestic consumer
surplus. Emission standards are weakly increasing in ￿, both under monopoly and duopoly, and







for K = fM;Cg.
Hence, as countries assign a larger importance ￿ to their national consumer surplus, they set
less strict environmental regulations to its corresponding ￿rm in order to induce larger production
levels (and lower prices). This result holds both for the case in which countries do not participate in
international agreements and in the case they do.21 Alternatively, weight ￿ could be interpreted as
consumer￿ s representation in the political process that determines emission standards. Under this
interpretation, a larger political representation of consumers￿interests would favor less stringent
emission standards. Finally, note that we consider ￿ to be exogenous. However, ￿rms might
have incentives to spend resources into lobbying activities in order to increase the weight that
policymakers assign to consumers￿welfare, strategically inducing less stringent emission standards
(as shown in proposition 7).
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes two externalities that domestic environmental regulation imposes on foreign
countries￿welfare ￿ environmental and competitive advantage externalities￿ under di⁄erent mar-
ket structures. In particular, under monopoly only environmental externalities are present, whereas
under duopoly both types of externalities exist. The paper hence disentangles the e⁄ect of these
externalities.
19For simplicity, we assume that ￿ < 2, which guarantees that the negative externalities from higher emissions
(EE and CAE) dominate the positive consumer surplus externality. This assumption still allows countries to assign
di⁄erent weights to their consumers￿welfare, either higher or lower than the importance countries assign to their
domestic ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, if ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1, respectively.
20Note that, otherwise, less stringent emission standards from one country would impose an overall positive ex-
ternality on other countries￿welfare, and therefore international agreements should call for an increase in countries￿
emissions.
21Our results extend to other social welfare functions in which countries assign di⁄erent weights to consumer
surplus, pro￿ts and environmental damage from pollution. Speci￿cally, the results hold when emissions standards are
strategic substitutes, i.e., more stringent standards in one country lead other countries to relax the emission levels
they set to domestic producers. Therefore, emission standards maintain their nature of global public goods.
17We compare the emission standards independently selected by every country with respect to
those they choose as members of an international environmental agreement, internalizing one or
both types of externalities. The paper demonstrates that emission standards countries sign in
international treaties that consider both types of externalities are more stringent than those in-
ternalizing only one externality. Furthermore, we show that ￿rms￿pro￿ts increase as a result of
countries￿participation in international agreements if the environmental damage from pollution is
su¢ ciently low and pollution is not signi￿cantly transboundary. Hence, ￿rms would actually favor
their countries￿participation in IEAs under certain conditions. This result provides an additional
bene￿t from environmental agreements: to serve as a cooperative tool duopolists use to mitigate
overproduction and increase pro￿ts, without the need to form collusive agreements.
The paper assumes that duopolists are symmetric in their cost structure. The model could be
modi￿ed to consider the case in which ￿rms are asymmetric. In such case, environmental regulation
would not necessarily coincide across countries, both if countries participate in an IEA and if they
do not. Asymmetric environmental regulations in equilibrium might induce ￿rms to shift their
production decision towards those countries with the least stringent emission standards. This
could promote, for instance, acquisitions of ￿rms located in countries with di⁄erent environmental
regulations, thus modifying the market structure.
Information about production costs is common knowledge among other ￿rms and countries.
In a di⁄erent model, however, every ￿rm would be privately informed about its marginal produc-
tion costs, but not about rivals￿costs. In contrast, governments might have relatively accurate
information about their domestic ￿rms￿marginal costs after years of regulation. In this context, a
government￿ s environmental regulation to domestic ￿rms signals information about the e¢ ciency
of national ￿rms to their foreign competitors, which a⁄ects their entry decision.
188 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Di⁄erentiating the monopolist￿ s pro￿t with respect to qi and solving for qi we obtain the monopolist
output as a function of emission standard ei,
qM
i (ei)=
(a￿ ￿ 1) + 4ei
2(2 + ￿)













￿ (i.e., if ei >
(a￿￿1)(4+￿)+(2+￿)8ej










￿ (i.e., if ei <
4+￿[1+4ej+a(4+￿)]
8(2+￿) ￿ ei), we have
that qC
i = 0 and qC
j =
(a￿￿1)+4ej
2(2+￿) (in this case, ￿rms￿best response functions intersect at the








(4+￿)(4+3￿) (interior solution), which is positive if and only if ei < ei,








2(2+￿) if ei ￿ ei,
￿[a(4+￿)￿1￿4ej]+8ei(2+￿)￿4
(4+￿)(4+3￿) if ei ￿ ei < ei, and
0 if ei < ei
Note that existence of the Cournot equilibrium is satis￿ed: ￿rst, the inverse demand curve
satis￿es p(0) = a, which exceeds the marginal cost evaluated at qi = 0, 1￿4ei
￿ . Second, ￿rm j￿ s best
response function, qC
j (qi), evaluated at qi = 0, a￿￿1+4ei
￿ , exceeds the monopoly output a￿￿1+4ei
2(2+￿) ,
which holds for all parameter values. In addition, uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium output is
also satis￿ed since the absolute value of the slope of every ￿rm￿ s best response function, ￿
2(2+￿), is
lower than one for all parameter values.
In the case where both countries set symmetric emission standards in the ￿rst stage of the game,




￿ , as in the third case indicated above. Hence, the




8.2 Proof of Proposition 1














represents ￿rm i￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts under monopoly, for a given emission










￿ d ￿ 0












8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
When countries maximize their joint welfare (internalizing both externalities, BE), they select ei
























￿d(1 + ￿) ￿ 0








4 d if d < 1
(1+￿)dM, and
0 otherwise.








￿d(ei + ￿ej) ￿ d￿ei












208.4 Proof of Proposition 3




i (ei;ej);ei) ￿ d(ei + ￿ej)
where ￿i(qC
i (ei;ej);ei) denotes ￿rm i￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts under duopoly, for emission standards
ei and ej. Di⁄erentiating with respect to ei,
16(2 + ￿)2 [￿(a(4 + ￿) ￿ 4ej ￿ 1) ￿ 4]
￿(4 + ￿)2(4 + 3￿)2 ￿
4[128 + ￿(160 + ￿(64 + 9￿))]
(4 + ￿)2(4 + 3￿)2 ei ￿ d ￿ 0
where the ￿rst two terms represent the marginal bene￿t from setting less stringent emission stan-
dards to ￿rm i, MBC







(4+￿)2(4+3￿)2 ei if ei > b ei
0 otherwise
where b ei =
4(2+￿)2[￿(a(4+￿)￿4ej￿1)￿4]
￿[128+￿(160+￿(64+9￿))] , and similarly for country j. Solving for ei we obtain ei(ej).













8.5 Proof of Proposition 4




i (ei;ej);ei) ￿ d(ei + ￿ej) ￿ d￿ei
di⁄erentiating with respect to ei,
MBC
i ￿ d(1 + ￿) ￿ 0
where MBC









4[48+￿(44+9￿)] d if d < 1
(1+￿)dC;NT, and
0 otherwise.





i (ei;ej);ei) ￿ d(ei + ￿ej) + ￿j(qC
j (ei;ej);ej) ￿ d(ej + ￿ei)
























(4+￿)2(4+3￿)2 ei if ei > e ei
0 otherwise
where e ei =
2(2+￿)2[￿(a(4+￿)2￿16(2+￿)ej￿￿￿8)￿16]














8.6 Proof of Corollary 1










i ￿ FRM, which is weakly
positive for all parameter values (see section 4.1).




i since they both start at the same vertical
intercept,
4(2+￿)2(a￿￿1)
￿[48+￿(44+9￿)], and they are both linear in d, but e
C;EE
i decreases in d faster than e
C;NT
i
does (in particular, from propositions 3 and 4, the negative slope of e
C;EE
i is (1+￿) times larger than
that of e
C;NT




i since the vertical intercept of e
C;EE







￿(16+9￿) , and in addition, both expressions are linearly decreasing
in d, but the horizontal intercept of e
C;EE
i , 1
1+￿dC;NT, is larger than that of e
C;BE



















￿[48+￿(44+9￿)]. Second, both expressions are
linear and decreasing in d, but the horizontal intercept of e
M;BE
i , 1
1+￿dM, is larger than that
of e
C;NT





￿(4+￿)(4+3￿)2 . We can therefore conclude that the














228.7 Proof of Proposition 5
EE treaty. We compare equilibrium pro￿ts without treaty, ￿
C;NT
i , and with an international
treaty that internalizes the EE e⁄ect alone, ￿
C;EE
i . First, we compare pro￿ts under positive
emission levels, d < dC;EE; second under environmental damages supporting positive emission
standards only under NT, dC;EE < d < dC;NT; and third, when environmental damages sustain






d￿(4 + ￿)(4 + 3￿)
2(32 + A￿)
8￿[48 + ￿(44 + 9￿)]
2





i = 0, then the di⁄erence decreases in d (becoming negative) for all d < 1
2dEE, and





i = 0 at exactly d = dEE, where
dEE￿
16(2 + ￿)(a￿ ￿ 1)
(2 + ￿)￿(4 + ￿)(16 + 9￿)























i indeed occurs at levels of environmental damage for which countries set positive
emission standards, both under NT and EE. Second, if dC;EE < d < dC;NT, then eC;EE = 0 but





starting at the lower bound of this interval d = dC;EE and this di⁄erence converges to zero only at
the upper bound of this interval, d = dC;NT. Third, if d > dC;NT then emission standards are zero













i for all d > dEE.
BE treaty. Let us now compare equilibrium pro￿ts without treaty, ￿
C;NT
i , and with an
international agreement that internalizes both the EE and CAE e⁄ects, ￿
C;BE
i . In the case of







2[16 + ￿(8 ￿ 8a(2 + ￿) + dB][￿((8a(2 + ￿) ￿ 8 + dC) ￿ 16]
8￿2(16 + 9￿)[48 + ￿(44 + 9￿)]
2
where B = 48￿+44￿￿+9(2+￿)￿2+16(7+6￿) and C = ￿[48+￿(44+9￿)]￿8(2+￿). Speci￿cally,






￿2(16+9￿)[48+￿(44+9￿)]2 < 0, then the di⁄erence
increases in d for all d < dC;BE, becoming zero only at d = dBE, where
dBE ￿
8(2 + ￿)(a￿ ￿ 1)
￿[48￿ + 44￿￿ + 9(2 + ￿)￿
2+16(7 + 6￿)]
23Note that the di⁄erence dBE ￿dC;BE is decreasing ￿, and becomes zero at ￿ = ￿
3[32+3￿(8+￿)]
4(8+5￿) < 0.





i indeed occurs at levels of environmental damage for which countries set
positive emission standards, both under NT and BE. Second, if dC;BE < d < dC;NT, then eC;BE = 0





starting at the lower bound of this interval, d = dC;BE, and this di⁄erence converges to zero only at
the upper bound of this interval, d = dC;NT. Third, if d > dC;NT then emission standards are zero













i for all d > dBE.
Finally, note that the di⁄erence between the two cuto⁄s identi￿ed in this proof, dBE ￿ dEE,
is decreasing in ￿, and becomes zero at ￿ = ￿
2(48+48￿+9￿2)
32+36￿+9￿2 < 0. Therefore dBE < dEE for all
parameter values.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 6




















Note that in the case that both countries set symmetric emission standards in the ￿rst stage of the
game, ei = ej, equilibrium output qcartel
i (ei;ej) is an interior solution of the problem.





i (ei;ej);ei) ￿ d(ei + ￿ej)


















(4 + ￿)(a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d￿)[16 + ￿(40 + 17￿)]
[48 + ￿(44 + 9￿)][48 + ￿(88 + 25￿)]
which is positive for all d < a￿￿1
￿ . Since dC;NT < dcartel;NT < a￿￿1
￿ for all parameters
values, we can conclude that, for all strictly positive emission standards under the cartel





242. Cartel considering the EE e⁄ect. When countries internalize the EE e⁄ect, country i




i (ei;ej);ei) ￿ d(ei + ￿ej) ￿ d￿ei

















a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (1 + ￿)d￿






which is positive for all d < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿. Since, dC;NT < dcartel;NT < a￿￿1




(1+￿)￿ for all parameter values. We can therefore conclude that for all
strictly positive emission standards under the cartel (d ￿ 1






3. Cartel considering the EE and CAE e⁄ects. When countries internalize both types of




i (ei;ej);ei) ￿ d(ei + ￿ej) + ￿j(qcartel
j (ei;ej);ei) ￿ d(ej + ￿ei)
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which is positive for all d < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿. Since, dC;BE < dcartel;BE < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿. Therefore, for
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2(a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (1 + ￿)d￿)
￿(16 + 25￿)[48 + ￿(88 + 25￿)]
> 0
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￿[48 + ￿(88 + 25￿)]
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(4 + ￿)(4 + 3￿)[a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d￿]
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￿(16 + 25￿)
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for all parameter values.
8.9 Proof of Proposition 7
First note that ￿rms￿maximization problem is una⁄ected, relative to the case in which consumer
surplus was not considered. Hence, for given emission standards ei and ej, both monopoly output
qM
i (ei) and duopoly output qC
i (ei;ej) coincide with that speci￿ed in Lemma 1. Let us next examine
equilibrium emission standards.




















￿ d(ei + ￿ej)












￿(2+￿)2 . First, note that e
M;NT
i is decreasing in d for all ￿ < 2 < 2+￿,
which is satis￿ed by assumption. Additionally, note that e
M;NT






(2 + ￿)(a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d￿)
4￿(2 + ￿ ￿ ￿)2
which is weakly positive for all d < a￿￿1
￿ , which is satis￿ed since d < dM;NT < a￿￿1
￿ .
2. Monopoly, with a treaty considering the EE e⁄ect. When countries consider the EE



















￿ d(ei + ￿ej) ￿ d￿ei








4(2+￿￿￿) d if d < 1
1+￿dM;NT, and
0 otherwise.




































￿ d(ej + ￿ei)
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ei we obtain the same ￿rst order conditions than in the case





First, note that e
M;EE
i is decreasing in d for all ￿ < 2 < 2+￿, which is satis￿ed by assumption.
Second, e
M;EE







2 [a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d(1 + ￿)￿]
4￿(2 + ￿ ￿ ￿)2
which is positive for all d < a￿￿1

















4(2 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
;
which is positive by de￿nition since ￿ < 2 < 2 + ￿.


















￿ d(ei + ￿ej)












￿(4+￿)(4+3￿)2 . First, note that e
C;NT
i is decreasing in d for all
￿ <
48+￿(44+9￿)
24+10￿ , which is satis￿ed by assumption since ￿ < 2 <
48+￿(44+9￿)
24+10￿ . Second, e
C;NT
i is






(4 + ￿)(4 + 3￿)
2 (12 + 5￿)(a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d￿)
2￿[48 ￿ 2￿ (12 + 5￿) + ￿(44 + 9￿)]
2
which is positive for all d < a￿￿1
￿ , which is satis￿ed since d < dC;NT < a￿￿1
￿ .
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4[48￿2￿(12+5￿)+￿(44+9￿)]d if d < 1
1+￿dC;NT, and
0 otherwise.
First, note that e
C;EE
i is decreasing in d for all ￿ <
48+￿(44+9￿)
24+10￿ , which holds by de￿nition
since ￿ < 2 <
48+￿(44+9￿)
24+10￿ . Second, e
C;EE






(4 + ￿)(4 + 3￿)
2 (12 + 5￿)[a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d(1 + ￿)￿]
2￿[48 ￿ 2￿ (12 + 5￿) + ￿(44 + 9￿)]
2
which is positive for all d < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿, which is satis￿ed since d < 1
1+￿dC;NT < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿.
5. Duopoly, with treaty considering all externalities. When countries internalize all
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￿(1+￿)(4+3￿)2 First, note that e
C;TE
i is decreasing in d for all ￿ < 2 + 9￿
8 ,
which holds by de￿nition since ￿ < 2 < 2+ 9￿
8 . Second, e
C;TE








2 [a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d(1 + ￿)￿]
￿(16 + 9￿ ￿ 8￿)2
28which is positive for all d < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿, which is satis￿ed since d < dC;TE < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿.










d￿(4 + ￿)(4 + 3￿)
2
4[48 ￿ 2￿ (12 + 5￿) + ￿(44 + 9￿)]
which is weakly positive for all ￿ <
48+￿(44+9￿)
24+10￿ , which holds by de￿nition since ￿ < 2 <
48+￿(44+9￿)











2 [a￿ ￿ 1 ￿ d(1 + ￿)￿][4(2 + ￿) ￿ ￿(4 ￿ ￿)]
2￿(16 + 9￿ ￿ 8￿)[48 ￿ 2￿ (12 + 5￿) + ￿(44 + 9￿)]
which is weakly positive since d < dC;TE < a￿￿1
(1+￿)￿, ￿ < 2 <
4(2+￿)
4￿￿ , ￿ < 2 < 2 + 9￿
8 , and
￿ < 2 <
48+￿(44+9￿)
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